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Causa materialis: "...that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists... eg. the bronze of a statue, the silver of a bowl, and the genera of which the bronze and the silver are species." [194b23-6] (Bk II, ch.3)

Causa formalis: "...the form or the archetype, ie. the statement of the essence, & its genera, are called 'causes' (eg. of the octave the relation of 2:1, and generally number), and the parts in the definition." [194b27-29]

Causa efficiens: "...the primary source of the change or coming to rest; eg. the man who gave advice is a cause, the father is a cause of the child, and generally what makes of what is made and what causes change of what is changed." [194b29-31]

Causa finalis: "...in the sense of the end or 'that for the sake of which a thing is done, eg. health is the cause of walking about... the same is true also of all the intermediate steps... [done] as means towards the end... All these things are 'for the sake of' the end, though they differ from one another in that some are activities, other instruments." [194b32-b1]

Incidental to causes: (I) Polyclitus, a pale sculptor is the cause of a statue. i) "a man", "a pale man", and "a sculptor" are incidental attributes to... ii)Polyclitus, the proper cause or genera [195a35]

Potential cause: "eg... house-builder" [195b5]
Actual cause: "eg... house-builder building" [195b5]
Specific and general causes: "eg... of 'this bronze' or 'of bronze', or 'of material' generally" [195b10], or 'Polyclitus, sculptor'.

Combinations: Actual, particular causes may pass-away w. their effect (eg. that housebuilding man w. that being-built house); not always the case w. potential causes (eg. the house and the housebuilder do not pass-away simultaneously). [195b15-20]

"In investigating the cause of each thing it is always necessary to seek what is most precise (as also in other things): thus man builds because he is a builder, and a builder in virtue of his art of building. This last cause is prior: and so generally." [195b21-5]

"Further, generic effects should be assigned to generic causes, particular causes, eg. statue to sculptor, this statue to this sculptor; and powers are relative to possible effects, actually operating causes to things which are actually being effected." [195b25-30]

On Chance: i) "We observe that some things always come to pass in the same way, and others for the most part [neither of these is said to be due to chance or have chance as a cause.... But there is a third class of events besides these [first] two... for we know that things of this kind are due to chance and things due to chance are of this kind." [196b10-15] (Bk. II, ch.5)

ii) "But, secondly, some events are for the sake of something, others not. Again, some of the former class are in accordance w. deliberative intention, others not, but both are in the class of things which are for the sake of something... [even among things outside] the necessary and normal, there are some [which we may say are 'for the sake of something']. Things of this kind, when they come to pass incidentally, are said to be 'by chance'." [196b15-25]

iii) "For just as a thing is something either in virtue of itself or incidentally, so may it be a cause. For instance, the housebuilding faculty is in virtue of itself the cause of a house, whereas the pale or the musical [attribute of the man] is the incidental cause. That which is per se cause of the effect is determinate, but the incidental cause is indeterminable, for the possible attributes of an individual are innumerable. To resume then: when a thing of this kind comes to pass among events which are for the sake of something, it is said to be spontaneous or by chance."

"Example: A man is engaged in collecting subscriptions for a feast... [he runs into someone who owes money while on an errand]... it was [therefor] only incidentally that he got his money by going there [to that place]; and this was not due to the fact that he went there as a rule or necessarily, nor is the end effected (getting the money) a cause present in himself -- it belongs to the class of things which are intentional and the result of intelligent deliberation*... If he had gone there of deliberate purpose and for the sake of this [eg. payment]... he would not be said to have gone 'by chance'." [196b33-7a4] (*Check translation of this sentence.)

"It is clear then that chance is an incidental cause in the sphere of those actions for the sake of something which involves purpose. Intelligent reflection; then, and chance are in the same sphere, for purpose* implies intelligent reflection." [197a5-7] (*Check translation of word.)

iv) "...chance is an incidental cause. But strictly it is not the cause -- w/o qualification -- of anything; for instance, a housebuilder is the cause of a house; incidentally, a flute-player may be so." [197a10-15] (Bk. II, ch.5)

v) "[Not every incidental cause is relevant to the effect, though, quite obviously]" [197a24]

vi) "Both [chance and spontaneity] are then... incidental causes... in the sphere of things which are capable of coming to pass, not necessarily, nor normally, and w. reference to such of these as might come to pass for the sake of something." [197a32-35]

On Spontaneity: i) "They [chance and spontaneity] differ in that spontaneity is the wider term. Every result of chance is from what is spontaneous, but not everything that is from what is spontaneous is from chance." [197a35-b1] (Bk.II, ch.6)

ii) "Chance and what results from chance are appropriate to agents which are capable of good fortune and moral action generally... Hence what is not capable of moral action cannot do anything by chance... Even these things, however, can in a way be affected by chance, when one who is dealing w. them does something to them by chance..." [197b1-10]

iii) "The spontaneous, in the other hand, is found both in the lower animals and in many inanimate objects." [197b15]

iv) " Hence it is clear that events which 1) belong to the general class of things which come to pass for the sake of something, 2) do not come to pass for the sake of what actually results, and 3) have an external cause, may be described by the phrase 'from spontaneity'." [197b15-20]

v) "The difference between spontaneity and what results by chance is greatest in things which come to be by nature; for when anything comes to be contrary to nature, we do not say that it came to be by chance, but by spontaneity. Yet strictly too this is different from the spontaneous proper; for the cause of the latter is external, that of the former internal." [197b30-5]

vi) "Spontaneity and chance, therefor, are posterior to intelligence and nature." [198b10]

On Real Physics & On Processes: "Now, the causes being four, it is the business of the physist to know about them all, and if he refers his problem back to all of them, he will assign the 'why' in the way proper to his science -- the matter, the form, the mover, 'thatfor the sake of which'. The last three often conincide; for the 'what' and 'that for the sake of which' are one, while the primary source of motion is the same in species as these (for man generates man), and so too, in general, are all things which cause movement by being themselves moved; and such as are not of this kind are no longer inside the province of physics, for they cause motion not by possessing motion or a source of motion themselves, but being themselves incapable of motion. Hence there are three branches of study, one of things which are incapable of motion, the second of things in motion, but indestructible, the third of destructible things." [198a20-32] (Book 2, Ch.7)

Explaining Nature & Necessity: "We must explain... 1) that Nature belongs to the class of causes which act for the sake of something; 2) about the necessary & its place in physical problems..." [198b10] (Book II, ch.8)

"[Why should it not be like this], eg. that our teech should come up of necessity -- the front teeth sharp, fitted for tearing, the molars broad and useful for grinding down the food -- since they did not arise for this end, but it was merely a coincidental result; and so with all other parts in which we suppose that there is purpose? Wherever than all the parts came about just what they would have been if they had come to be for an end, such things survived, being organized spontaneously in a fitting way; whereas those which grew otherwise perished and continue to perish, as Empedocles says his 'man-faced ox-progency' did." [198b15-32]

"[Impossible] For teeth and all other natural things either invariably or normally come about in a given way; but of not one of the results of chance or spontaniety is this true. We do not ascribe to chance or mere coincidence the frequency of rain in Winter, but frequent rain in Summer we do, nor heat in the dog-days, but only if we have it in Winter. If then, it is agreed that things are either the result of coincidence or for an end, and these cannot be the result of coincidence or spontaniety, it follws that they must be for an end; and that such things are all due to nature even the champions of the theory before us would agree. Therefor action for an end is present in things which come to be and are by nature." [198a35-199a10]

On Mutations & Mistakes: "Now mistakes come to pass even in the operations of art: the grammarian makes a mistake in writing and the doctor pours out the wrong dose. Hence clearly mistakes are possible in the operations of nature also... Thus in the original combination the 'ox-progency [man-faced]' if they failed to reach a determinate end must have arisen through the corruption of some principle corresponding to what is now the seed." [199a35-b10] (Book II, ch.8)

"Moreover, among the seeds anything must have come to be at random. But the person who asserts this entirely does away with 'nature' and what exists 'by nature'. For those things are natural which, by a continuous movement originated from an internal principle, arrive at some conclusion: the same completion is not reached from every principle; nor any chance completion, but always the tendency in each is towards the same end if there is no impediment." [199b15-20]

On Nature & Chance: i) "The end and the means towards it may come about by chance [i.e. incidentally]." [199b19]
ii) "It is absurd to purpose is not present because we do not observe the agent deliberating. Art does not deliberate. If the ship building art were in the wood, it would produce the same results by nature." [199b26-30].

On Necessity & Material Cause: i) "...Though a wall does not come to be without [certain materials arranged just-so], it is not due to these except as its material cause: it comes to be for the sake of sheltering and guarding certain things." [200a5]
ii) "...Why is a saw such as it is? To effect so and so, and for the sake of so and so. This end, however, cannor be realized unless the saw is made of iron, It is, therefor, necessary for it to be of iron, if we are to have a saw and perform to operation of sawing." [200a10-13]
iii) "...Necessity is in the matter, while 'that for the sake of which' is in the definition." [200a14]
iv) "The necessary in nature, then, is plainly what we call by the name of matter, and the changes in it." [200a30]

[The Metaphysics]
Opening: "...causes are spoken of in four sense. In one of these we mean the substance, i.e. the essence (for the 'why' is reducible finally to the definition, and the ultimate 'why' is a cause and principle); in another matter or substratum, in a third the source of a change, and in a fourth the cause opposed to this, the purpose and the good (for this is the end of all generation and change.)" [983a25-b1]

On Thales: "[Water as first principle]" [983b20-4a5[
On Anaximenes & Diogenes: "[Air as first principle, prior to water]" [984a5]
On Hippasus of Metaportium & Heraclitus: "[Fire as first principle, prior to others]" [984a7]
On Empedocles: "[Four elements]... these, he says, always remain and do not come to be except that they come to be more or fewer, being aggregated into one and segregated out of one." [984a10]
"[Seemed to also be the first to posit the bad and the good as principles, with friendship and strife as source of movement (efficient cause)." [985a5-10]
On Anaxagoras of Clazomenae: "...who, though older than Empedocles, was later in his philosophic activity, says the principles are infinite in number; for he says almost all the things that are made of parts like themselves, in the manner of water or fire, are generated and destroyed in this way, only by aggregation and segregation, and are not in any other sense generated or destroyed, but remain eternally." [984a11-16]
On Leucippus & Democritus: [985b3-20]
On the Pythagoreans: "[Number as]...principle both as matter for things and as forming both their modifications and their permanent states, and fold that the elements of number are the even and the odd, and that of these the latter is limited and the former unlimiter; and that the One proceeds from both of these (for it is both even and odd), and number from the One..." [986a15-20]
"[Another group]...ten principles...limit and unlimited, odd and even, one and plurality, right and left, male and female, resting and moving, straight and curved, light and darkness, good and bad, squared and oblong..." [986a23-27]
On Plato: (Book I, ch.6) complicated... "[Only possesses material and formal causes]"; (Book I, ch.9) *Does not mention eros as a source of "motion" in Plato... being sneaky?

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